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Essays in constitutional law are often about something more than the
historical texts at hand. Professor Michael Glennon's 1988 essay-Two Views
of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-
Wright?l-was a heartfelt effort to challenge the existence of an independent
foreign affairs power in the Presidency, especially in the deployment and use
of military force. Its argument was shaped around the controversy of the
day-the effort by the Reagan White House in "Iran Contra" to deliver covert
aid to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua despite Congress's bar to American
involvement. For any earthly observer, a well-tempered theory of separation
of powers is likely to vary, at least in detail, according to the substantive
values at stake. Still, it seems a little hard to blame Justice George
Sutherland-as author of the famous "sole organ" theory of American
presidential power in foreign affairs-for what went right or wrong with our
policy in Nicaragua.
Despite the sober subject matter, it might take a Noel Coward play to
capture the to-and-fro of Presidents and Congresses in foreign affairs
decisions. Congressmen want final political authority over the deployment of
American armed forces in areas where combat may occur,2 until they discover
that the political risks are formidable. Congress has authorized a conflict in its
early stages, supporting earmarked appropriations, but then winsomely
asserted that the war belongs to someone else.3 With equal fallibility,
American Presidents and their courtiers have been tempted to act alone in
areas where Congress would freely offer support after proper briefing and
consultation. The marriage of the Executive and the Congress is as
complicated as any other.
But frequent missteps in execution at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue
are no reason to doubt the seriousness of the theory of an independent
executive power in foreign affairs. John Locke spoke of a "federative"
authority that has no counterpart in a narrowed account of executive powers.4
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The American Constitution was framed with the failures of the Articles of
Confederation well in mind, including the difficulties of prosecuting a
revolutionary war through a weak Executive. At a time when members of
Congress met only in season, and were separated from the national capital by
days of travel from their constituent districts, it was hardly surprising to posit
some independent capability and emergency power in the Chief Executive.5
And in two centuries since then, the conduct of diplomacy-squarely
committed to the President-sometimes has required the threat or intimation
of force. Military power and diplomacy are linked-whether in discouraging
European nations from meddling on the North American continent in the early
republic, or in cautioning Beijing against pressuring Taipei, by moving
American carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits in 1996.
The power of Congress to declare war has been infrequently exercised.
Presidents face many short-term situations that depend upon the deployment
of military assets to signal commitment and deter adversaries. These are not
"wars"-even if limited force is ultimately used6-and requiring a declaration
of war would often be a dangerous escalation. Asking the President to resort
to Congress for a more graduated authorization of the use of force may be
politically wise, but its proponents gain no comfort from the literal text of
Article I, Section 8.
In Curtiss-Wright'? Justice Sutherland rather modestly argued that
Congress can choose to delegate to the President a greater discretion in
foreign affairs decisions (in particular, in limiting arms exports) than might be
permissible in a domestic matter. (In its fretful worry about delegation, the
case also reveals itself as a period piece of the New Deal.) The justification
for broad delegation is founded on the need for flexibility, action, and
confidentiality-the very qualities of foreign affairs that may also justify a
broad independent power in the Presidency. Sutherland argues that there is an
independent foreign affairs competence in the Executive-"plenary,"
"exclusive," and certainly, "delicate"-based on the President's necessary role
as "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.,,8
Our contemporary hard-wired American democracy highly values
transparency and local voice. In the midst of a non-stop on-air national town
meeting, it may indeed be "delicate" to talk about independent executive
("These two powers, executive and federative ... are always almost united.... [W]hat is to be done in
reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions and the variation of designs and interests,
must be left in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them, to be
managed by the best oftheir skill for the advantage ofthe commonwealth.'').
5. Cf. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ...
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such inuninent Danger as will not admit ofdelay.'').
6. See generally DEP'T OF STATE, HISTORICAL STUDIES DIVISION, ARMED AcnONS TAKEN
BY THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT ADECLARATION OF WAR, 1789-1967 (1967); MILTON OFFUIT, THE
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1928); RIGHT TO
PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES: MEMORANDUM BY THE SOLICITOR FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (3d rev. ed. 1934).
7. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
8. ld. at 320.
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power. Yet the President is as democratically elected as the Congress. And
many of the founders' warnings linger in the observed facts of real life.
Members of Congress can be local in their concerns. The bluffand bargaining
necessary in foreign relationships often depends on confidential sources of
information that will tum to ashes if they are imprudently disclosed. And the
recognized problem of "collective action" frequently hobbles a Congress,
since no single member has to take responsibility for the failure to act in the
face ofan urgent challenge.
The shadowy life of executive constitutional power is, in part, a
reflection of political discretion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
even the English king's law officers advised that it was wiser to revert to the
Parliament, where possible, than to assert infrequently used prerogative
powers.9 That is all the more true in a twenty-first-century democracy. But
the "delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations" of which
George Sutherland wrote,lO was held in high esteem by men as politic as
Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall. Congressman Marshall's famous
"sole organ" speech,l1 upon which Sutherland drew, concerned the power of
the President to surrender a defendant to face foreign trial and execution, even
without an implementing statute by Congress to regulate the terms of criminal
arrest under the hated Jay Treaty.12 John Marshall's view of presidential
power was broad indeed, for he contemplated a final authority in the President
to determine certain questions of treaty law, beyond the power of judicial
revision.13
The Great Chain of Being for the "sole organ" theory leads back one
step more, to the famous text upon which Marshall drew in his description of
the President's powers-and this was Hamilton's celebrated Pacificus essay.
Hamilton hails the President
as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations-as the interpreter of
the National Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is not competent, that is in the
cases between Government and Government-as that Power, which is charged with the
Execution of the Laws, of which Treaties form a part-as that Power which is charged
with the command and application ofthe Public Force. 14
For Hamilton, the Constitution's vesting of "the EXECUTNE POWER ... in
the President" is a "comprehensive grant."lS Article II omits any exhaustive
enumeration of his tasks precisely because the President's residual power
9. See generally LAW OFFICERS' OPINIONS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 1793-1860 (Clive Parry
ed., 1970-73).
10. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
I I. See 10 ANNALSOFCONG. 613-14 (1800).
12. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom ofJonathan Robbins, 100 YALE LJ.
229 (1990).
13. See id. at 348-49.
14. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 38 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).
15. Id. at 39.
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must treat the matters that are too irregular for legislation.16 The President
must serve (even ifreluctantly so) as a well-spring, when other mechanisms of
government have failed.
Hamilton's views were disputed in his own day by James Madison, and
by Thomas (although not President) Jefferson, as well as other Republicans.
(There is nothing new, under the sun, in most corners of constitutional law.)
The early Republicans saw the Presidency as far more robotic, carrying out
appointed ministerial duties set by Congress. Michael Glennon thus enjoys
distinguished company in a preference for legislative dominance. But the
constructive tension between Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian views of
democratic government should not obscure the somber consequences that
attach to a democratic perfectionism that depends solely on Congress.
Indeed, Justice Robert Jackson could be enlisted as an ally in this view.
A close reading ofhis famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case17 shows a
remarkable latitude for executive power. The rule is famous as a triptych,
stating in outline that the President's power is at its apex when authorized by
Congress, at its nadir when opposed by Congress, and of middle strength
when Congress is indifferent. Yet the opinion is really about five categories,
not three, including several different varieties of Congressional silence. An
American President is entitled to act upon his good-faith reading of
constitutional power, and Justice Jackson allows him plenty of room to forge
ahead so long as Congress has not attempted to stop him dead in his tracks. In
Justice Jackson's account, the President has greatest power when he acts in
accordance with the "expressed or implied authorization" of Congress.I8 His
power ebbs to its lowest mark when he acts in opposition to the "expressed or
implied will" of Congress.19 And of course, a Congress that has no view is
also silent. Congress is not put to much work in this model. Its wishes can be
left hanging in the air, in the mysterious clouds of inchoate legislative history,
without the burden ofcoming to an actual decision.
The real lesson of the Steel Seizure Case is, rather, that citizens are off-
limits. The constitutionally protected entitlements of citizens, in liberty and
property, may sharply limit the domain of presidential foreign affairs power.
The Steel Seizure Case demanded clearer authorization for the war in Korea,
and for the seizure of steel plants, than Harry Truman had. When citizens are
burdened and gain standing, the locus of decision may switch from the Oval
Office to a federal courtroom. But in the absence of such domestic effect a
President retains the power of initiative, even under Justice Jackson's test, and
is able to read Congress's silence as he believes is fair.
It is true, as Professor Glennon suggests, that a theory of sovereignty
does not tell us which branch should exercise a nation-state's inherent powers.
16. One might note, here, the distinction drawn betweenjurisdictio and gubernaculum in English
constitutional theory. See CHARLES HOWARD McILWAIN, CONSTITIJTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN
84-85 (rev. ed. 1947).
17. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
18. ld. at 635 (emphasis added).
19. ld. at 637 (emphasis added).
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has used an implicit theory of sovereignty to
strengthen Congress's own legislative powers as well, pennitting Congress to
legislate in areas that are otherwise inadmissible, so long as it is in execution
of a foreign agreement.20 But the latitude allowed to Congress, when it acts in
foreign affairs, may also be a clue to the range pennitted to the President.
In the current period, the views of the Executive and the Senate have
frequently diverged on proposed treaty engagements. The place of executive
power, in these circumstances, may gain a kinder hearing. One observer of the
Washington scene has speculated that in the future the United States will
rarely be able to ratifY multilateral treaties, but rather will have to seek
engagement with our allies and arrangement with our adversaries through
parallel understandings, gentlemen's agreements to abide by treaty nonns
even when the treaty cannot be sworn to. One assumes that Professor
Glennon's skepticism towards executive power may well adapt to the times.
It is not obscurantism to suppose that some questions in constitutional
law should never be finally answered. Competing theories of legitimate power
are part of what helps to provide political balance. An unbounded sense of
constitutional entitlement may tempt a beneficiary branch to act immodestly,
without the chastened sense that acceptance will tum upon good judgment as
well as procedure. Hence, even in disagreement, one may salute Professor
Glennon's eloquence and purpose, and, of course, celebrate the role of The
Yale Journal ofInternational Law in continuing the debate.
20. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
